

Institute of Cognitive Science

Bachelor's Thesis

Ethical Objectivism vs. Relativism in the Light of Neuroscientific Findings

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Summary

In this essay I argue for a relativist meta-ethical theory that takes into account findings from neuroscience and related fields. It is embedded in a general constructivist epistemology which I will defend on philosophical and on neuroscientific grounds. Ethical objectivism is challenged by contrasting its epistemological premises with the above-named constructivist epistemology and by developing an explanation of how subject-relative moral values are constructed by individuals on the basis of their implicit and explicit memory traces as well as their reasoning and emotional appraisal. I present a semantic theory of truth that allows to assign truth-values to moral statements in relation to the individual's moral beliefs.